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Commentaries
Admissibility of Testing by the
Psychological Stress Evaluator
John A. Ronayne, Esq.t
I. Introduction
Dean Wigmore's statement: "If there is ever devised a psy-
chological test for the valuation of witnesses, the law will run to
meet it,"1 was made over sixty years ago. Rather than running to
meet the use of the lie detector as a test for the evaluation of
witnesses, the law, as reflected in appellate court decisions, has
gone to unusual extremes to avoid it.
The use of electronic devices such as Voice Stress Analyzers
or Psychological Stress Evaluators as methods of voice stress
analysis has developed during the last ten years. The voice anal-
ysis test relies upon the electronic recording of the physical
characteristics of the human voice as a measure of "stress" or
"psychological stress." These devices have been used to try to
determine if the subject of the test was lying in response to
questions, just as the polygraph has been used as a lie detector.
Electronic analysis of the voice spectrum, directed toward lie de-
tection, has been the subject of scientific testing for a much
shorter period of time than the polygraph. Due to the limited
opportunities for judicial appraisal of proofs submitted in sup-
port of the voice analysis test, these new devices have fared no
better in court than the polygraph. The admissibility of the re-
sults of a polygraph test has been denied by appellate courts
t Professor of Law Emeritus, Brooklyn Law School, B.S.; J.D., Fordham University;
M.P.A., L.L.M., New York University.
1. 2 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 875, at 237 (2d ed. 1923).
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since 1923.
Frye v. United States3 was the first appellate court decision
on the admissibility of the results of a lie detector test in a trial.
The trial court judge refused to admit into evidence the results
of tests conducted by Professor Marston on the defendant Frye,
who was on trial for murder. After Frye's conviction, the refusal
to admit the test results was raised as error on the appeal.'
The United States Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Frye's
contention of error and upheld the inadmissibility of the evi-
dence. Ironically, Frye was decided in 1923, the same year that
Wigmore published his statement. The Frye court specifically
stated:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line
between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to
define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the
principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way
in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized
scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduc-
tion is made must be sufficiently established to have gained gen-
eral acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
We think the systolic blood pressure deception test has not
yet gained such standing and scientific recognition . . . as would
justify the courts in admitting expert testimony deduced from the
discovery, development, and experiments thus far made.'
The court's rejection of the particular form of the lie detec-
tor test, the systolic blood pressure test, was correct at the time
and stage of development of the instrumental detection of de-
ception.6 The landmark decision in Frye, however, stands im-
movable even today. For over sixty years, all other appellate
courts considering the question have "parroted"7 its language
that the lie detector has not yet achieved "general acceptance in
2. See infra notes 4-9 and accompanying text.
3. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
4. Id. at 1014.
5. Id.
6. The systolic blood pressure test was performed using a standard medical blood
pressure cuff with the standard sphygmomanometer dial. The readings from the dial
were recorded by hand and then plotted on graph paper. For a description of the method
used, see Marston, Psychological Possibilities in the Deception Tests, 11 J. CraM. L. C. &
P.S. 551 (1921).
7. Wicker, The Polygraphic Truth Test, 22 TENN. L. REV. 711, 723 (1953).
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the particular field in which it belongs." 8 The denial of admissi-
bility of the evidence offered by Professor Marston, though le-
gally correct at the time, was most unfortunate for the defend-
ant. James A. Frye was ultimately found innocent of the crime
and released from prison several years later, when another man
confessed to the crime for which Frye had been convicted.'
A. Nature of the Problem
The Frye decision correctly pinpointed the admissibility of
expert testimony as the true issue in the case. Many cases de-
cided since Frye and many legal commentators have mistakenly
directed their attention to the question of the accuracy or relia-
bility of lie detectors. The mechanical, electronic, or elec-
tromechanical devices used for the instrumental detection of de-
ception are not "lie detectors." They are merely scientific
devices for recording physiological phenomena of the human
body. The polygraph records variations in the respiration, blood
pressure, pulse, and galvanic skin reflex by registering ink on a
moving chart. The voice analysis instruments usually record the
human voice on tape or tape cassettes, and replay the tapes
through the analysis equipment, producing a graph of the inau-
dible changes in the voice frequency modulation. In theory,
changes in the strength and pattern of the graph of the human
voice are caused by the degree of psychological stress of the
speaker.
Yet, none of these machines can detect lies by itself. Just as
the interpretation of an X-ray plate and the presentation as evi-
dence to a court requires an expert radiologist or a skilled physi-
cian, the qualifications of an expert in the field of the instru-
mental detection of deception are likewise essential to the
admissibility of the results from a lie detector test.
The other major problem of proof in the admissibility of ev-
idence of lie detection by mechanical or electronic devices is
proof of the connection between the recorded physiological
changes and lying. Actually, the body's hormonal responses to
an emotional situation or to stress rapidly induce a variety of
8. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
9. FOURTEENTH ANN. REP. N.Y. JuD. COUNCIL 265 (1948).
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physiological changes, including blood pressure, respiration,
pulse, and the psychogalvanic response used in the polygraph to
detect deception. When the speaker is under stress, voice analy-
sis devices detect variations in microtremors or inaudible voice
frequencies.
The problem in the instrumental detection of deception,
still not resolved completely, is the pinpointing of the emotional
responses associated with lying. Emotional response or stress
may arise from sources other than lying. The instruments used
in the polygraph or the voice stress analyzers record variations
to any emotional response or stress. Experience with the poly-
graph has shown that the emotional responses of a person who
has actually committed a crime and is being administered a
polygraph test are remarkably more intense and more readily
observable than the responses of a person being tested in a sim-
ulated laboratory experiment. Variations in the voice micro-
tremors recorded on the voice analysis equipment are not as
readily observable.
The questions prepared by the examiner and asked of the
subject under controlled conditions are designed to distinguish
whether variations in the recorded responses were due to lies or
to other stresses or emotions. The preparation and administra-
tion of the questions in the test are critical in distinguishing be-
tween stress caused by falsehood and stress caused by fear, anxi-
ety, or other reasons. To identify variations attributable to lying,
the examiner must establish a norm by obtaining responses to
neutral or control questions. Repetition of the series of questions
will produce reduced or normal responses to noncritical ques-
tions while responses to critical questions will remain high or
increase.
B. The Polygraph
The so-called "polygraph" was in existence as early as 1908
as an instrument used in medical examinations by Dr. James
Mackenzie, an English heart specialist. He described the instru-
ment used for measuring and recording pulse and respiration on
a moving chart as "The Ink Polygraph." 10 The objective measur-
10. Mackenzie, The Ink Polygraph, 1 BRIT. MED. J. 1411 (1908), reprinted in INBAU,
[Vol. 9:243
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ing and recording of physiological changes have been matters of
interest to researchers in experimental psychology for many
years. The polygraph test is based upon the findings by psychol-
ogists that deviations from truth in the form of conscious lies
cause an emotional response which can be detected by scientific
measuring devices.
Professor Hugo Munsterberg, Professor of Psychology at
Harvard University, published a book on his studies of the ef-
fects of emotions upon bodily functions in 1923. 1 Professor
Munsterberg concluded that experimental psychology could fur-
nish everything a court demands in the detection of lying. 2
More recently, Dr. David Lykken, referring to the polygraph,
wrote in the magazine Psychology Today: "When lie-detector
tests are designed, administered and evaluated properly, they
may be one of the most valid psychological tools we possess.' 3
Research conducted for more than sixty-five years into
physiological responses (called the cardiovascular, respiratory,
and galvanic responses) which are recorded upon the polygraph
indicates that these responses are based upon the functioning of
the human brain and the autonomic nervous system.1' The auto-
nomic nervous system responds to emergencies and to the emo-
tions of a person under stress. Thus a conscious lie causes a re-
action in the autonomic nervous system which can be detected
and recorded by the instruments in the polygraph.15
C. Voice Analysis
Compared to the polygraph, voice analysis as a lie detection
technique does not have the years of scientific research needed
to authenticate it as reliable. In fact, none of the research per-
formed and reported so far, except for that conducted by a man-
ufacturer of the equipment (which tested only three subjects),
has found voice analysis to be reliable.'"
MOENSSENS & VITULLO, SCIENTIFIC POLICE INVESTIGATION (1972).
11. H. MUNSTERBERG, ON THE WITNESS STAND (1923).
12. Id. at 108-10.
13. Lykken, The Right Way to Use a Lie Detector, 8 PSYCHOLOGY TODAY 56 (1975).
14. FERGUSON & MILLER, THE POLYGRAPH IN COURT 102-05 (1973).
15. Id.
16. Kubis, Comparison of Voice Analysis and Polygraph as Lie Detection Proce-
dures (unpublished report) (prepared for U.S. Army Land Warfare Laboratory,
1989]
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Four of five different instruments designed for the elec-
tronic analysis of the speech spectrum have appeared on the
market, all apparently directed at lie detection. One instrument
is known as the Dektor Psychological Stress Evaluator. The Psy-
chological Stress Evaluator and several voice stress analyzers
produce a graph of the variations of microtremors in the sub-
ject's voice. In comparison, the Hagoth Voice Stress Analyzer
DAAD05-720C-0317, August 1973); Nachson & Feldman, Vocal Indices of Psychological
Stress: A Validation Study of the Psychological Stress Evaluator, 8 J. POL. ScL. & AD-
MIN. 40-53 (1980). In this latest validation study under scientific conditions, Professor
Nachson, the Chairman of the Department of Criminology at Bar-Ilan University, Israel,
and Benjamin Feldman, a clinical psychologist at Kaplan Hospital, Rehovat, Israel, con-
ducted tests with three trained PSE examiners on graduate students under laboratory
conditions and also on tape recordings of the verbal responses of criminal suspects un-
dergoing standard polygraph interrogations by staff members of the Laboratory for Sci-
entific Interrogation of the Israel Police at police headquarters. Their laboratory tests on
the graduate students were made under two conditions: the first, a card test requiring
the examiners to pick out the correct card selected by the subject and the second, a
"Horror Picture Test" in which the subject was shown neutral color pictures of land-
scapes and then pictures of accident victims and told to respond to all views: "Yes, I like
this picture."
In the card test, none of the trained examiners scored better than 40% in identifying
correctly the card picked by the subject. All three judges examining the same PSE record
reached a common decision only 10% of the time. In the "Horror Picture Test," no ex-
aminer identified the false statement in more than 50% of these cases.
Since results of polygraph studies have shown that different results are obtained in
field studies of criminal suspects from those obtained under laboratory conditions, field
tests were conducted by Nachson and Feldman by recording the verbal responses of sus-
pected criminals under polygraph interrogation by the police; the investigators then pre-
pared PSE charts in the same manner as in the laboratory study. All of the criminal
suspects were also given card tests before the polygraph examination. Their answers
were recorded, and PSE charts were prepared for the examiners to study.
In the card test, an examiner's decision was considered correct when it corresponded
with the suspect's actual selection. No single examiner made more than 21% correct
identifications of the cards from the PSE charts of the suspects. For the polygraph test,
validity of the PSE chart selection was determined by comparing the PSE decisions with
the corresponding polygraph decisions. The PSE decision was considered correct when it
corresponded with the polygraph decision. No PSE examiner scored better than 53.6%
in distinguishing those who were lying from those who were telling the truth. The level of
accuracy by pure chance would be 50%.
Nachson and Feldman concluded that no test in their study produced any validation
for the use of the PSE as a detector of psychological stress. Tobin, A Validation of Voice
Analysis Techniques for the Detection of Psychological Stress, 6 CRIME & Soc. DEVI-
ANCE 50-54 (1978). In this scientific study, which included both card tests and polygraph
interrogations performed on 32 criminal suspects, Tobin found the Stress Evaluator was
not valid for the detection of deception. DECISION CONTROL INC., U.S. ARMY LAND WAR-
FARE LABORATORY, TECHNICAL REPORT No. LWL-CR-03B70, APPLICATION OF VOICE ANALY-
SIS METHOD (1971).
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol9/iss2/2
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does not use a graph or chart, but displays a series of green
lights if the subject is not under stress and red lights if he is
under stress.17 Another voice stress analyzer produces a digital
read out, indicating by numerical means either stress or the tell-
ing of a lie. Other voice stress analyzers have been produced
in the form of a wrist watch or to resemble a pocket-sized
calculator.
The manufacturers of these voice analysis instruments
claim an advantage over the polygraph in that no physical at-
tachments, such as the blood pressure cuff or respiration tubes,
are affixed to the subject. One objection to voice analysis equip-
ment is that it can be used without the speaker's knowledge by a
person operating a voice analysis device over the telephone. One
union protested that such devices were being used by an em-
ployer against employees who called in sick, to determine if they
were telling the truth.18 Objections by unions and civil rights or-
ganizations have resulted in legislation banning the use of voice
analyzers in employment investigation or in other investigations
outside of criminal matters. 9
II. Research into Validity of Voice Analysis
Research into the validity of the use of two voice analysis
machines was performed for the United States government by
Dr. Joseph F. Kubis of Fordham University in 1973.20 Studies in
17. HAMILTON, HAGOTH AN ANTHOLOGY, HAGOTH CORPORATION (1978).
18. N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1973, at 47, col. 5.
19. N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 733-39 (McKinney 1988).
20. Kubis, supra note 16. This study involved a simulated theft, with one student
playing the part of the thief, one the lookout, and one the innocent person who was kept
away from the theft. The thief was told to enter the office of a female professor, open her
handbag which was on the desk, examine the contents of the bag, and remove only the
contents of the change purse. The change purse contained $21 in bills, wrapped in a red
ribbon. The lookout was to stand in the hall outside the professor's office to make sure
that no one was around when the thief entered the office. The victim professor's office
was not actually in use by anyone at the time, but other offices on the same floor were in
use by professors and students. After the simulated theft, the three students were kept
separate and examined separately.
One hundred thirty-seven of the students in the group of 174 were examined by a
polygraph operator in the presence of a graduate student who acted as a tape recorder
monitor, recording the subject's words so that they could later be replayed through the
voice analysis machines. The remaining 37 students were not tested on the polygraph,
but they were questioned and their answers were recorded for analysis on the voice anal-
1989]
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the detection of deception by lie detectors were begun at Ford-
ham University by Father Summers in the 1930s21 and have con-
tinued over many years.22 The objectives of Kubis' research pro-
ject were to evaluate voice analysis as a lie detection technique
and to compare the efficiency of two voice analysis instruments
with the polygraph. 3 The two instruments studied in this pro-
ject were the Dektor Psychological Stress Evaluator and the
Voice Stress Analyzer manufactured by Decision Control
Incorporated.2 '
The use of the voice analysis techniques was evaluated in a
simulated theft experiment, which examined 174 male and fe-
male university students."3 One group of 135 subjects was ex-
amined with a polygraph at the same time as voice recordings
were made. Another group of thirty-six subjects was tested only
on the voice analysis machine. In this way, the last group was
not subject to any additional stress by the attachment of the
blood pressure cuff and other components of the polygraph
while undergoing questioning and recording of their voices. In
order to simulate a theft of a female professor's handbag, three
students were used. One student was told to play the part of a
thief, another to play the lookout and the third to remain in a
separate room apart from the others. After the simulated theft,
the students playing the part of the thief and lookout returned
to the control offices separately and were kept apart so that the
lookout did not know what had been stolen. The third student,
who had been kept in another room, was told that there had
been a theft from a faculty office and that he was going to be
questioned, but since he was not involved, he had no cause to
worry.2
The three students were questioned separately. The experi-
ment required the polygraph operator and the operators of the
voice analysis machines to identify the thief, the lookout, and
ysis machines. The results of the analyses on both machines tested provided no evidence
to support the use of voice stress analysis equipment as lie detectors.
21. Summers, Science Can Get the Confession, 8 FORDHAM L. REV. 334 (1939).
22. Kubis, supra note 16.
23. Id. at 1.
24. Id. at 9.
25. Id. at 11, 23.
26. Id. at 11-24.
[Vol. 9:243
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the innocent party. The polygraph operator achieved an accu-
racy rate of 76% in distinguishing among the three. Neither of
the voice analysis devices, although operated by a trained exam-
iner, was any more effective than pure chance. The operator of
the Psychological Stress Evaluator achieved an average accuracy
rate of 32%. When he knew which subjects had been in each
group of three, he obtained an accuracy rate of 53%. The opera-
tor of the Voice Stress Analyzer produced accuracy rates of 34%
for subjects who had been hooked up to the polygraph when
their voices were recorded, and 43% for the other students. The
rate of accuracy for determining the correct answer from three
possible choices by pure chance would be 33%.2"
Analysis of the results from these machines provided no evi-
dence to validate the use of voice stress analysis equipment as
lie detectors. In fact, the graduate student who was recording
the voice of each subject during the examinations achieved a
rate of accuracy of 55% from his observation of the subjects be-
havior, appearance, and the nature of his vocal response.29
III. Case Law Involving Voice Stress Analysis
Very few lawyers are aware of the burgeoning number of
cases involving detection of deception by voice stress analysis.
There have been numerous cases in the last several years involv-
ing lie detection by the use of voice stress analysis, 30 and others
27. Id. at 13-26.
28. Id. at 35.
29. Id. at 36.
30. Barrel of Fun, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 739 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir.
1984); Joubert v. Travelers Indem. Co., 736 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Johns, 734 F.2d 657 (11th Cir. 1984); Milano v. Garrison, 677 F.2d 374 (4th Cir. 1981);
United States v. Traficant, 566 F. Supp. 1046 (N.D. Ohio 1983); Adkinson v. State, 611
P.2d 528 (Alaska 1980); Larsen v. Motor Supply Co., 117 Ariz. App. 507, 573 P.2d 907
(1977); State v. Thompson, 5 Conn. App. 157, 497 A.2d 423 (1985); Florida Bar v. Bren-
nan, 377 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 1979); Mann v. State, 154 Ga. App. 677, 269 S.E.2d 863 (1980);
People v. Lippert, 125 Ill. App. 3d 489, 466 N.E.2d 276 (1984); Losee v. State, 374
N.W.2d 402 (Iowa 1985); Neises v. Solomon State Bank, 236 Kan. 767, 696 P.2d 372
(1985); State v. Thompson, 381 So. 2d 823 (La. 1980); State v. Guillory, 373 So. 2d 133
(La. 1979); State v. Schouest, 351 So. 2d 462 (La. 1977); State v. Overton, 337 So. 2d
1058 (La. 1976); State v. Brumley, 320 So. 2d 129 (La. 1975); State v. Singleton, 311 So.
2d 881 (La. 1975); State v. Segura, 464 So. 2d 1116 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 468 So.
2d 1203 (La. 1985); State v. Helsley, 457 So. 2d 707 (La. Ct. App. 1984); Langford v.
Leesville, 442 So. 2d 1375 (La. Ct. App. 1983); Carter v. Catfish Cabin, 316 So. 2d 517
19891
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which made reference to voice stress analysis in matters involv-
ing the admissibility of polygraph evidence."
The issue of admissibility of evidence of voice stress analy-
sis has been raised in a surprising variety of cases. One unusual
case involved an attempt by a defense counsel to introduce voice
stress analysis of the voice of the defendant pilot talking to a
control tower to prove that he was not under stress.32 The de-
fendant was charged with flying controlled substances into the
country in violation of federal law.3 3 The court rejected the of-
fered evidence."'
A. Cases Involving Licensing Statutes
Illinois had one of the earliest cases involving voice stress
analysis in Illinois Polygraph Society v. Pellicano3 5 Apparently,
a controversy had been waged for several years between voice
analysis examiners and polygraph operators. Illinois has a Detec-
tion of Deception Examiner Act,36 which provides for the licens-
ing and regulation of lie detector examiners. Section three of
(La. Ct. App. 1975); Langworthy v. State, 46 Md. App. 116, 416 A.2d 1287 (1980); Smith
v. State, 31 Md. App. 106, 355 A.2d 527 (1976); State v. Jungbauer, 348 N.W.2d 344
(Minn. 1984); State v. Ochalla, 285 N.W.2d 683 (Minn. 1979); In re T. Y. K., 183 Mont.
91, 598 P.2d 593 (1979); Simon Neustadt Family Center, Inc. v. Bludworth, 97 N.M. 500,
641 P.2d 531 (1982); People v. Tarsia, 50 N.Y.2d 1, 405 N.E.2d 188, 427 N.Y.S.2d 944
(1980); Scott v. Transkrit Corp., 91 A.D.2d 682, 457 N.Y.S.2d 134 (2d Dep't 1982); State
v. Milano, 297 N.C. 485, 256 S.E.2d 154 (1979); State v. Makerson, 52 N.C. App. 149, 277
S.E.2d 869 (1981); Miller v. City of York, 52 Pa. Commw. 483, 415 A.2d 1280 (1980);
Todd v. South Carolina Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 287 S.C. 190, 336 S.E.2d 472 (1985);
Sabag v. Continental South Dakota, 374 N.W.2d 349 (S.D. 1985); Rogers v. Tennessee
Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 612 S.W.2d 178 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980); State v. Mason, 31 Wash.
App. 41, 639 P.2d 800 (1982); In re Smith, 30 Wash. App. 943, 639 P.2d 779 (1982).
31. Gray v. Udevitz, 656 F.2d 588 (10th Cir. 1981); Caldwell v. State, 267 Ark. 1053,
594 S.W.2d 24 (1980); Borlin v. Civil Service Comm'n, 338 N.W.2d 146 (Iowa 1983); Peo-
ple v. Barbara, 400 Mich. 352, 255 N.W.2d 171 (1977); State v. Century Camera, 309
N.W.2d 735 (Minn. 1981); Gawel v. Two Plus Two Inc., 309 N.W.2d 746 (Minn. 1981);
Kamrath v. Suburban Nat'l Bank, 363 N.W.2d 108 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); State v. La-
france, 124 N.H. 171, 471 A.2d 340 (1983); Union Leader Corp. v. Chandler, 119 N.H.
442, 402 A.2d 914 (1979); State v. Anthony, 100 N.M. 735, 676 P.2d 262 (Ct. App. 1983);
State v. Grier, 307 N.C. 628, 300 S.E.2d 351 (1983); State v. Meadows, 306 N.C. 683, 295
S.E.2d 394 (1982).
32. Johns, 734 F.2d 657.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 660.
35. 83 Ill. 2d 130, 414 N.E.2d 458 (1980).
36. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111, 2401-32 (Smith-Hurd 1978 & Supp. 1988).
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol9/iss2/2
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this Act requires that every examiner use an instrument which
records as a minimum, the subject's cardiovascular and respira-
tory pattern.3 7 This had the effect of requiring every examiner to
use a polygraph. The defendant in this case was engaged in the
business of detecting deception using the Psychological Stress
Evaluator. He was not licensed as an examiner, however.3 8 The
plaintiffs, polygraph operators who had organized into the Illi-
nois Polygraph Society, sought to enjoin the defendant from ad-
ministering examinations to detect deception. The plaintiffs in-
voked the provisions of the Illinois Detection of Deception
Examiner Act.39 The circuit court denied the defendant's motion
to dismiss, but allowed him to file an interlocutory appeal. The
Illinois intermediate appellate court reversed the circuit court
and found that the Act was unconstitutional as special legisla-
tion because it granted polygraph operators a monopoly. The Il-
linois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and con-
cluded that the Act was constitutional."0 The Illinois Supreme
Court held that the Act was not special legislation, since there
was sufficient doubt about the reliability of detection of decep-
tion instruments, and the varying expertise of those who use
them, to justify the legislature's decision to set minimum
standards."'
The Illinois Detection of Deception Examiner Act was
passed about seven years before the voice analysis technique
came on the market, and the legislature failed to take into ac-
count the possibility of future scientific developments. Appar-
ently in this particular Act, the legislature did not intend to
make any statement about the comparative reliability of the pol-
ygraph and voice stress analysis in detecting deception. Other
states have been specific in banning voice analysis devices in em-
ployment situations," some have banned polygraphs and lie de-
37. Illinois Polygraph Soc'y, 83 Ill. 2d at 136, 414 N.E.2d at 461.
38. Id. at 133, 414 N.E.2d at 460. He used the Dektor Psychological Stress Evaluator
and did not seek to be licensed, which would require him to undergo a training course on
the polygraph.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 145, 414 N.E.2d at 466.
42. MINN. STAT. § 181.75 (1988); S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-53-40 (Law. Co-op 1976).
19891
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tectors in employment situations, 3 and several states have made
it an offense to use a voice stress analysis machine without the
consent of the subject."
Other states have passed legislation similar to that in Illi-
nois, mandating the licensing of polygraph operators. In effect,
these statutes prohibit the use of other devices by requiring the
equipment used to record the cardiovascular and respiratory
pattern of the subjects. Examiners using the Psychological
Stress Evaluator brought actions attacking the constitutionality
of such laws in several states.
In Heisse v. Vermont," Dr. Heisse, a physician licensed to
practice medicine in Vermont, was also a practitioner in the de-
tection of deception by the Psychological Stress Evaluator
(PSE). He applied for a license under the Vermont Polygraph
Examiners Act"6 and was denied.47 Dr. Heisse brought a civil
rights action in the federal court claiming a violation of the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the
Constitution. The district court held that the Vermont Act did
not violate the United States Constitution.48 The court found
that the state had a valid interest in regulating professions, es-
pecially the detection of deception by physiological and psycho-
logical testing, which affects the public interest particularly as it
relates to individual rights. 9 The court stated that although sev-
eral studies have analyzed the reliability of the PSE as a device
for detecting truth and deception and concluded that the PSE is
a reliable and workable instrument, there is disagreement in the
scientific community about the validity of PSE testing.5° The
43. ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.037 (1984); CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.2 (West 1971 & Supp.
1989); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51g (West 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 704 (1974 &
Supp. 1988); HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-26.5 (1985); MD. ANN. CODE art. 100, § 95 (1985 &
Supp. 1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 19B (West Supp. 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 181.75 (West Supp. 1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:40A-1 (West 1982 & Supp. 1988); N.Y.
LAB. LAW §§ 733-39 (McKinney 1988); OR. REV. STAT. § 659.225 (1987); WAsti. REV. CODE
ANN. § 49.44.120 (Supp. 1988).
44. CAL. PENAL CODE § 637.3 (West 1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 19B
(West Supp. 1988).
45. 519 F. Supp. 36 (D. Vt. 1980).
46. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 2901-10 (Supp. 1988).
47. Heisse, 519 F. Supp. at 39.
48. Id. at 49.
49. Id. at 48.
50. Id. at 41.
[Vol. 9:243
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use of the polygraph is advantageous because an individual can-
not be subjected to a truth or deception test without his knowl-
edge. Testimony by witnesses in Heisse indicated that a PSE
test had been conducted without the knowledge of the subject."
The court concluded that the state legislature had not acted to
create an unreasonable and arbitrary classification. 52 The state
had a rational basis in limiting licensing to polygraph operators,
in view of the fact that the polygraph has wider acceptance
within the scientific community and a longer history of use than
does the PSE.
Dr. Heisse did not give up however, and brought an action
in a Vermont state court 53 contending that the Vermont "Sunset
Act" automatically repealed the Polygraph Examiners Act effec-
tive July 1, 1981. 5" After losing in the trial court, Dr. Heisse won
in the Vermont Supreme Court.55 The court held that the Poly-
graph Examiners Act expired July 1, 1981 under the provisions
of the Sunset Act, leaving Dr. Heisse free to practice detection
of deception with the PSE under Vermont law.5
A criminal prosecution was brought in Texas under the li-
censing and recording provisions of the Texas Polygraph Exam-
iners Act.5 7 The defendant was convicted in the trial court and
appealed, contending that the Act was unconstitutional. 8 The
state court of Criminal Appeals held that the Act was constitu-
tional in that it was rationally related to a legitimate state inter-
est,59 but it reversed the conviction of the defendant because the
evidence was insufficient to prove that he had used the PSE as
51. Id. at 50.
52. Id. at 46.
53. Heisse v. State, 143 Vt. 87, 460 A.2d 444 (1983).
54. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 3101-07 (Supp. 1988). The Vermont "Sunset Act"
states as its policy and purpose that
regulation be imposed upon a profession or occupation solely for the purpose of
protecting the public. The legislature believes that all individuals should be per-
mitted to enter into a profession or occupation unless there is a demonstrated
need for the state to protect the interests of the public by restricting entry into
the profession or occupation.
Id. § 3101.
55. Heisse, 143 Vt. 87, 460 A.2d 444.
56. Id. at 88, 460 A.2d at 445.
57. Clark v. State, 665 S.W.2d 476 (Tex. Crim. 1984).
58. Id. at 479.
59. Id. at 481.
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an instrument for detecting deception without a license."
B. Statutes Prohibiting Voice Stress Analysis in Employment
There have been numerous cases involving statutes restrict-
ing the use of the PSE in employment situations. In a New York
state case, Northdurft v. Ross,6 the plaintiff brought an action
against Ross, the state Industrial Commissioner, to declare Arti-
cle 20-B of the Labor Law"2 to be unconstitutional and to re-
strain the defendant from enforcing it. The plaintiff, a PSE ex-
aminer, claimed an unconstitutional adverse effect upon the
practice of his occupation.6 3 The court rejected his contention,
holding that the Act was constitutional and intended to safe-
guard individuals in employment situations against the invasion
of their privacy by PSE examinations. 4
Another New York case, which strikingly illustrated the
lack of knowledge of employees, lawyers, and even the trial court
regarding the PSE was Scott v. Transkrit Corp. Scott and
other former employees brought an action to recover damages
under Article 20-B of the Labor Law, 6 charging that the de-
fendant, their former employer, had unlawfully administered a
PSE examination to them in violation of the state law.6 7 The
defendant proved that the tests administered to its employees
were polygraph tests based upon blood pressure, pulse, galvanic
skin response, and breathing pattern which were not prohibited
by the Labor Law. 8 The New York Supreme Court, Special
Term, denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment
and he appealed to the Supreme Court, Appellate Division. 9
The appellate court reversed, finding that there remained no tri-
able issue of fact and holding that the defendant's motion for
summary judgment should have been granted and the complaint
60. Id. at 484.
61. 85 A.D.2d 658, 445 N.Y.S.2d 222 (2d Dep't 1981).
62. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 733 (McKinney 1988).
63. Northdurft, 85 A.D.2d at 658, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 222.
64. Id.
65. 91 A.D.2d 682, 457 N.Y.S.2d 134 (2d Dep't 1982).
66. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 733.
67. Scott, 91 A.D.2d at 682, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 135.
68. Id. at 683, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 135-36.
69. Id. at 682, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 135.
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dismissed.7" Apparently, the plaintiffs, their attorney, and the
trial term were completely unaware of the difference between
the PSE and the polygraph and were also confused by the word-
ing of the Labor Law.
C. PSE in Employment in States Without Applicable
Statutes
Most states do not have statutes such as New York's,
prohibiting the use of the PSE in employment situations. Some
of these states however, have had cases involving firing after
PSE examinations or refusal to take a PSE test.71 The appellate
courts in Arizona, Washington, and Pennsylvania upheld the
dismissals from employment under the traditional rule of dis-
missal from "at will" employment. The South Carolina Supreme
Court, on the other hand, upheld a trial court ruling which de-
nied the defendant employer's motion to dismiss for failure to
state a cause of action for wrongful discharge in connection with
the administration of a PSE test. In this case, the court granted
a motion by the plaintiff for the production of the records of the
investigation and the records of the PSE test.72 The Louisiana
appellate court held that admissions made by the plaintiffs dur-
ing a PSE test were insufficient grounds for dismissal of public
employees.
D. Cases Involving Admissibility of Voice Stress Analysis
After Verdict
The issue of admissibility of evidence of voice stress analy-
sis has been raised on appeal in some cases in which it was not
raised before the verdict was delivered. 73 A defense request for
70. Id. at 683, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 136.
71. Larsen v. Motor Supply Co., 117 Ariz. 507, 573 P.2d 906 (1977); Wells v. Dep't of
Corrections, 439 So. 2d 470 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 443 So. 2d 583 (La. 1983); Miller
v. City of York, 52 Pa. Commw. 483, 415 A.2d 1280 (Pa. 1980); Todd v. South Carolina
Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 278 S.E.2d 607 (S.C. 1981); In re Smith, 30 Wash. App. 943, 639
P.2d 779 (1982).
72. Todd, 278 S.E.2d at 612.
73. People ex rel. Snead v. Kirkland, 462 F. Supp. 914 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Government
of the Virgin Islands v. Joshua, No. 80/94 (D.V.I. Oct. 28, 1980) (LEXIS, Genfed library,
Dist file), aff'd, 676 F.2d 685 (3d Cir. 1982); Adkinson v. State, 611 P.2d 528 (Alaska),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 876 (1980); State v. Brown, 497 So. 2d 29 (La. Ct. App. 1986);
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admission of PSE tests made after a conviction, in a motion for
a new trial, was denied in Adkinson v. State 4 and in the Gov-
ernment of the Virgin Islands v. Joshua.5 In Louisiana v.
Helsley,76 the Court of Appeal of Louisiana held that it was per-
missible for the sentencing judge to use a presentencing report
which revealed that the defendant had submitted to polygraph
and PSE tests indicating that he had, in fact, murdered a miss-
ing juvenile."" The Louisiana Court of Appeal in State v.
Brown 78 upheld the discretion of the trial judge in allowing the
introduction of testimony by an expert witness that Brown had
taken and passed a voice stress analysis test.79 In spite of the
stated opinion of the expert that Brown had not lied when he
denied the robbery, the appellate court upheld the trial judge's
denial of a motion for a new trial.80 In Owens v. Kelley,"1 the
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit upheld a Georgia trial
judge's order that the defendant submit to PSE tests as a condi-
tion of probation. People ex rel. Snead v. Kirkland,82 decided in
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, involved a fantastic mo-
tion by a prisoner, convicted of four bank robberies, to have FBI
agents, a United States attorney, defense attorneys, judges, and
others submit to PSE tests to show that they had conspired to
convict him falsely. 83 Needless to say, this motion was denied.8 4
Another unusual case involved disciplinary action against an
attorney who had secretly recorded his client's statements in a
criminal case and then examined them on a PSE.8 5 The lawyer
had made an oral plea bargain with the prosecutor on behalf of
his client according to which the client would admit to the use of
State v. Helsley, 457 So. 2d 707 (La. Ct. App. 1984).
74. 611 P.2d 528 (Alaska), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 876 (1980).
75. No. 80/94 (D.V.I. Oct. 28, 1980) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file), aff'd, 676
F.2d 685 (3d Cir. 1982).
76. 457 So. 2d 707 (La. Ct. App. 1984).
77. Id. at 720.
78. 497 So. 2d 29 (La. Ct. App. 1986).
79. Id. at 31.
80. Id.
81. 681 F.2d 1362 (1982), reh'g denied, 697 F.2d 1094 (11th Cir. 1983).
82. 462 F. Supp. 914 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
83. Id. at 916-17.
84. Id. at 923.
85. Florida Bar v. Brennan, 377 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 1979).
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a firearm. 6 Following the PSE test, the attorney wrote to the
sentencing judge that his client had shown stress on questions
relating to the use of a firearm and that he did not believe that
his client was being candid with him. 7 The respondent attorney
pleaded guilty to a violation of the Code of Professional Respon-
sibility and was reprimanded."
The Supreme Court of Louisiana had at least nine appeals
from convictions in the criminal courts, six of them based upon
claims of involuntary confessions or admissions during or after
PSE tests.89 In all but one of the six cases, the court held that
the confessions were voluntary and admissible and that the de-
fendants had freely consented to take the PSE test. In State v.
Thompson, however, the court held that pretest statements are
an integral part of the PSE test." Since the defendant had
stated that the test information was not to be released to any
outside agency without his permission, the defense argued that
the trial court should have suppressed the pretest admission
upon the objection of defense counsel. 1 In none of these cases
were the results or the wording of the PSE test admitted into
evidence in the trial court.2 The Louisiana Supreme Court
stated in Thompson that the result of PSE tests are not admis-
sible at trial.93 This pronouncement was on the authority of
State v. Catanese, which dealt only with a polygraph.94 The
court, in a footnote, solved this discrepancy by concluding that
the PSE test was, if anything, less reliable than the polygraph.,"
In State v. Segura,96 the appeals court affirmed the decision
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1182.
88. Id. at 1181.
89. State v. Naas, 409 So. 2d 535 (La. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1119 (1982);
State v. Thompson, 381 So. 2d 823 (La. 1980); State v. Guillory, 373 So. 2d 133 (La.
1979); State v. Overton, 337 So. 2d 1058 (La. 1976); State v. Brumley, 320 So. 2d 129 (La.
1975); State v. Singleton, 311 So. 2d 881 (La. 1975); State v. Helsley, 457 So. 2d 707 (La.
Ct. App. 1984); State v. Segura, 464 So. 2d 1116 (La. Ct. App. 1983), cert. denied, 468 So.
2d 1203 (La. 1985).
90. Thompson, 381 So. 2d at 824.
91. Id. at 823.
92. See cases cited supra note 89.
93. Thompson, 381 So. 2d at 824.
94. State v. Catanese, 368 So. 2d 975 (La. Ct. App. 1979).
95. Id. at 980 n.14.
96. 464 So. 2d 1116, 1116 (La. Ct. App. 1983), cert. denied, 468 So. 2d 1203 (La.
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of the trial judge in rejecting the admission at trial of results of
a PSE test upon the defendant. In State v. Helsley,97 the court
upheld the admission of polygraph and PSE test results, among
other evidence used in determining the imposition of maximum
sentences after conviction.
Most of the cases on the admissibility of PSE and Voice
Stress Analyzer (VSA) tests involve appeals from denials of ad-
missibility in the trial courts. There are about a half-dozen
cases, however, where the trial court admitted the results of a
voice stress test. In most of these cases the appeals courts re-
versed. Appellate courts have sustained the trial courts' use of
the PSE test in sentencing in State v. Helsley98 and as a re-
quirement of probation in Owens v. Kelley." In addition, the
Supreme Court of Montana upheld the trial court's admission of
the results of polygraph and PSE tests upon stipulation in In re
T.Y.K. °00 In contrast, in Neises v. Solomon State Bank, 0' the
Supreme Court of Kansas ruled that the admission of PSE tests
to show that the insured burned his own home was reversible
error.' °0 Varying the usual theme, the Supreme Court of New
Mexico upheld the trial court's denial of admissibility of the re-
sults of a PSE test because the examiner was not qualified. In its
decision in Simon Neustadt Family Center v. Bludworth, '
however, this court stated that New Mexico would admit expert
testimony from a qualified PSE examiner, just as the courts of
New Mexico would admit testimony from a qualified polygraph
examiner. New Mexico is the only state in which an appellate
court has clearly stated that it would admit polygraph
testimony.104
The Court of Appeals of New York upheld a conviction in
People v. Tarsia'0 5 based upon a confession after a PSE test.
Although this case is universally cited as opposing the introduc-
1985).
97. 457 So. 2d 707, 722 (La. Ct. App. 1984).
98. Id. at 707.
99. 681 F.2d 1362 (1982), reh'g denied, 697 F.2d 1094 (11th Cir. 1983).
100. 183 Mont. 91, 598 P.2d 593 (1979).
101. 236 Kan. 767, 696 P.2d 372 (1985).
102. Id. at 381.
103. 97 N.M. 500, 641 P.2d 531 (1982).
104. State v. Dorsey, 88 N.M. 184, 539 P.2d 204 (1975).
105. 50 N.Y.2d 1, 405 N.E.2d 188, 427 N.Y.S.2d 944 (1980).
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tion of evidence from a PSE test, the trial court had actually
admitted testimony from the PSE examiner regarding the ques-
tions and answers as well as the examiner's testimony that the
test showed stress on the part of the defendant.106
There are two unique cases in the federal courts on the is-
sue of admissibility of voice stress analysis. In Milano v.
Garrison,10 7 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held
that Milano had received a fair trial in the North Carolina
courts and had not been deprived of his constitutional rights. 08
The state court had denied admission of the results of a PSE
test, but had approved admission of a polygraph test because
both parties had stipulated that the polygraph test could be ad-
mitted into evidence. 109 The interesting part about this decision
is that the district court had ruled that Milano was deprived of a
fair trial when the PSE test results were barred from
admission.110
In the civil case of Barrel of Fun, Inc. v. State Farm Fire &
Casualty Co.,"lx the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit va-
cated the decision of the district court judge and remanded to
allow the court to reconsider its decision without reliance upon
testimony as to the results of a PSE test which had been admit-
ted at the trial. The plaintiff had filed a claim for fire damage
which was rejected by the insurance company because the fire
was deliberately set and the insurer believed that the insured
was involved in the arson. 2 In a nonjury trial, the judge had
allowed an arson expert to testify as to the deliberate setting of
the fire and also as to his opinion from observing a PSE test that
the owner of the plaintiff corporation had knowledge of the ar-
son of the building.1 13 The PSE examiner had been barred by
the trial judge from testifying as to the test results, and the ap-
peals court upheld this ruling.114
106. Id. at 8, 405 N.E.2d at 191, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 946.
107. 677 F.2d 374 (4th Cir. 1981).
108. Id. at 375.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. 739 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1983).
112. Id. at 1029.
113. Id. at 1031.
114. Id. at 1033.
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The court in this case reviewed the law and history of the
PSE and stated that the overwhelming majority of those courts
which have considered the issue have held that PSE evidence is
inadmissible. 115 The court acknowledged that there was consid-
erable controversy over the continued advisability of the rule
against admission of polygraph evidence. 1 ' However, the ap-
peals court stated that the objections to admissibility of expert
testimony as to the results of a PSE test do not vanish with a
bench trial.1 17 The court held that the precedents ruling poly-
graph evidence inadmissible also preclude the admission of PSE
results."1 The court also noted that the question is unresolved
whether the revision of the Federal Rules of Evidence silently
abolished or adopted the Frye test.'19 It observed that the prin-
cipal purpose for adoption of Federal Rule of Evidence 703 was
to permit an expert witness to express an opinion based in part
or solely upon hearsay sources. 2 The court stated that its hold-
ing was in no way predicated upon any hearsay objection to the
expert's testimony but, rather, was predicated on the reliability
of the opinion. The decision also made clear that the court did
not mean to suggest that an expert's opinion would necessarily
become inadmissible under Rule 703 merely because the expert
gave some consideration to a PSE test. Here, however, the ex-
pert's opinion was stated to be based essentially upon the plain-
tiff's PSE test results.
The court also quoted with approval the opinion of Mary-
land's highest court in Smith v. State: "The difference, if any,
between the psychological stress evaluation test and a lie detec-
tor test is too minor and shadowy to justify a departure from our
prior decisions. A lie detector test by any other name is still a lie
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1029.
118. Id. at 1034.
119. Id. at 1033.
120. FED. R. EVID. 703 provides:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opin-
ion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the
hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in
forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be
admissible evidence.
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detector test."1 2 1
There must be some profound legal truth in the last sen-
tence of this quotation - "A lie detector test by any other name
is still a lie detector test" - since it was also cited with approval
by the New York Court of Appeals in People v. Tarsia.122 Al-
though this statement is obviously more truth than poetry, it
does bear some resemblance to Gertrude Stein's famous line of
poetry, "[a] rose is a rose, is a rose, is a rose."'2 3
In Tarsia, a jury found the defendant guilty of attempted
murder of his estranged wife. A recording of the answers the de-
fendant had given during an examination on a voice stress ana-
lyzer was admitted at the trial. The judgment was affirmed by
the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, 12 and the defendant ap-
pealed to the Court of Appeals, the highest court in New York
State. On appeal, the court concluded that it was not error to
admit testimony concerning the defendant's submission to a
voice stress evaluation test or to admit a tape recording of the
questions and answers asked during the test.'25
The defendant in Tarsia had been questioned as a suspect
in the shooting of his wife after having been read and having
waived his Miranda rights. ' 26 An appointment was made for him
to submit to a voice stress analysis test at the local police sta-
tion, and he arrived at the appointed time.' 27 He was again ad-
vised of his rights and again waived them, this time in writing.'28
He was familiarized with both the procedure of the tests and the
questions to be asked.2 9 His answers were recorded and fed
through the voice stress analyzer. 30 The results raised the exam-
iner's suspicions, and the defendant was questioned further.
1 3
'
121. 31 Md. App. 106, 120, 355 A.2d 527, 536 (1976).
122. 50 N.Y.2d 1, 405 N.E.2d 188, 427 N.Y.S.2d 944 (1980).
123. Stein, Sacred Emily, in GEOGRAPHY AND PLAYS 187 (2d ed. 1967).
124. People v. Tarsia, 67 A.D.2d 210, 415 N.Y.S.2d 120 (3d Dep't 1979), aff'd, 50
N.Y.2d 1, 405 N.E.2d 188, 427 N.Y.S.2d 944 (1980).
125. Tarsia, 50 N.Y.2d at 1, 405 N.E.2d at 188, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 944.
126. Id. at 5, 405 N.E.2d at 189, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 945.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 6, 405 N.E.2d at 190, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 945.
1:31. Id.
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Subsequently he admitted to shooting his wife.1 32 During the
session, which lasted nearly eleven hours, he made one oral and
two written confessions. 133
Tarsia's counsel contended upon appeal, as he had unsuc-
cessfully at pretrial suppression hearings, that the techniques
employed by the examiner in the voice stress test overbore the
defendant's will to such a degree that his confession must be
deemed involuntary, and thus inadmissible.13 ' Additionally, he
argued that the circumstances of the eleven hours of detention
during the interrogation and test-taking vitiated the confes-
sions. 1 35 He also alleged as error the introduction of the test as
well as the replaying of the tape-recorded questions and
answers.136
The New York Court of Appeals rejected all of these con-
tentions.1 37 With regard to the contention that the examiner
should not have been allowed to describe the administration of
the voice stress test - a description which necessarily included
a recitation of the questions asked, answers given, and his subse-
quent questioning of the defendant - the court concluded that
the examiner did not communicate his evaluation of the record-
ing to the jury. 38 The court, however, quoted the examiner as
saying that, after he had administered the test and read the
chart, he "saw stress indicated on the chart in regard to [Tarsia]
shooting his wife.' 39 The court found no error in the admissibil-
ity of this testimony, which seems clearly to be a statement
about the result of the voice analysis test, because the counsel to
the defendant had failed to object to this specific statement. '°
The court interpreted this failure to object as part of the defense
strategy to prove coercion. 141 The court reached this decision de-
spite the fact that the defense had objected to the admissibility
of the confessions and to the description of the voice stress anal-
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 8, 405 N.E.2d at 191, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 947.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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ysis test by the examiner at both the preliminary hearings and
at the trial. 4"
This result is even more remarkable because the New York
Court of Appeals is one of the few courts which has rejected con-
fessions made after, but separate from, a polygraph test. ' " The
New York court is the only one which has held that a confession
made after a polygraph test is inadmissible - for example, be-
cause the polygraph examiner had stated to the defendant that
the machine could tell if the defendant was lying, and that it
knew the truth "just like [you] and God."' 4 Similarly, in People
v. Zimmer, the New York court held that a confession made af-
ter a polygraph test was inadmissible because the examiner had
shown literature to the defendant which stated that the results
of the test could be used against her in court."45
Practically all the courts in the nation that have ruled on
the question have rejected the contention that an accused's con-
fession was rendered involuntary, and thus inadmissible, by rea-
son of the coercive effect of a polygraph examination itself.1"
The same Washington, D.C. court of appeals which issued the
Frye decision affirmed the admission of the testimony of a poly-
graph examiner in the case of Tyler v. United States."47 There
142. Id.
143. People v. Leonard, 59 A.D.2d 1, 397 N.Y.S.2d 386 (2d Dep't 1977); People v.
Zimmer, 68 Misc. 2d 1067, 329 N.Y.S.2d 17 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 4th Dep't), aff'd, 50 A.D.2d
955, 339 N.Y.S.2d 671 (4th Dep't 1972).
144. Leonard, 59 A.D.2d at 15, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 391.
145. Zimmer, 68 Misc. 2d at 1073, 329 N.Y.S.2d at 24.
146. Thompson v. Cox, 352 F.2d 488 (10th Cir. 1965); United States v. McDevitt,
328 F.2d 282 (6th Cir. 1964); Weston v. Henderson, 279 F. Supp. 862 (E.D. Tenn. 1967),
vacated on other grounds, 415 F.2d 343 (6th Cir. 1969); People v. Beagle, 6 Cal. 3d 441,
99 Cal. Rptr. 313, 492 P.2d 1 (1970); People v. Carter, 7 Cal. App. 3d 332, 88 Cal. Rptr.
546 (1970); Sotelo v. State, 264 Ind. 298, 342 N.E.2d 844 (1976); Montes v. State, 263
Ind. 390, 332 N.E.2d 786 (1975); Lee v. State, 338 So. 2d 395 (Miss. 1976); Pinter v.
State, 203 Miss. 344, 34 So. 2d 723 (1948); State v. Keiper, 8 Or. App. 354, 493 P.2d 750
(1972); State v. Cannon, 260 S.C. 537, 197 S.E.2d 678, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1067 (1973);
State ex rel. Weston v. Henderson, 220 Tenn. 1, 413 S.W.2d 674 (1967); Fernandez v.
State, 172 Tex. Crim. 68, 353 S.W.2d 434 (1962); Collins v. State, 171 Tex. Crim. 585, 352
S.W.2d 841 (1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 881 (1962); Webb v. State, 163 Tex. Crim. 392,
291 S.W.2d 331 (1956); Henson v. State, 159 Tex. Crim. 647, 266 S.W.2d 864 (1953);
Gasway v. State, 157 Tex. Crim. 647, 248 S.W.2d 942, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 874 (1952);
Hulen v. State, 157 Tex. Crim. 507, 250 S.W.2d 211 ('1952); McAdoo v. State, 65 Wisc. 2d
596, 233 N.W.2d 520 (1975).
147. 193 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 908 (1952).
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the purpose for admitting the testimony was to show the volun-
tariness of the confession. " 8 The polygraph examiner was al-
lowed to testify as to the circumstances of the test as well as the
questions asked and the responses given by the defendant. ' 9
The New York court distinguished Tarsia from Leonard
and Zimmer by explaining that in Tarsia the defendant was in-
formed that the test could not determine that he was lying and,
in addition, there was no statement that the test results could be
admissible in a trial. This latter distinction is difficult to under-
stand because the trial court in Tarsia did admit a statement as
to the results of the voice analysis test. The words used by the
examiner in Tarsia seem to be contrary to the spirit, if not the
letter, of the repeated Miranda warnings to the effect that any-
thing the defendant said would be taken down and could be
used in evidence against him. 5' If anything, the lack of warning
by the examiner seemed to lull the defendant into a false sense
of security; in other words, in order to obtain the defendant's
consent to take the voice stress test, the examiner arguably used
deceptive means if not actually misleading statements. In spite
of this, the court found no error in the admission of testimony
by the examiner that he told the defendant, after the test, that
he saw stress indicated on the chart in regard to Tarsia shooting
his wife. 51
It is hard to understand why the New York Court of Ap-
peals stated that the confessions in Zimmer and Leonard were
rejected because the polygraph operators in these cases implied
that the results of these tests could be admissible in a trial,
while the voice stress examiner in Tarsia did not say that the
results could be admitted. The results of lie detector tests have
been admitted in New York trial courts as far back as 1938,
when People v. Kenny 1 2 was decided. That case resulted in an
acquittal, which meant that there was no opportunity for an ap-
pellate court to review the admissibility of the evidence. 153 It
148. Id. at 31.
149. Id. at 26.
150. People v. Tarsia, 50 N.Y.2d 1, 13, 405 N.E.2d 188, 194, 427 N.Y.S.2d 944, 949-
50 (1980).
151. Id.
152. 167 Misc. 51, 3 N.Y.S.2d 348 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1938).
153. Idy
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was not until People v. Leone5 in 1969 that the highest court in
New York reached a definitive decision denying the admissibil-
ity of results of a polygraph test. The court quoted the rule of
the Frye case as though it were a precedent established by judi-
cial notice that evidence by a polygraph examiner must be
barred.155
The results of polygraph tests and admissions made during
the test were admitted into evidence in a paternity case in the
New York Family Court in 1972,156 in a New York City Civil
Court case in 1972,157 and in a New York Supreme Court case in
1979.11 Evidence of the results of polygraph examinations has
also been admitted in hearings on motions to dismiss an indict-
ment.159 Federal trial courts have admitted polygraph evidence
in various cases, 160 as have courts in other states.161 Since poly-
graph evidence has been admitted upon trial in New York, it is
hard to see how a statement to that effect can be coercive or
render a confession inadmissible, especially in view of the re-
quired Miranda warnings.
The New York court in Tarsia was correct in holding that
the voice stress analysis test had been used simply as an investi-
gatory tool and the defendant's subsequent confession was not
rendered inadmissible as involuntary." 2 The defendant's state-
ments were not rendered involuntary as a matter of law merely
because they followed the voice stress analysis test. The state-
ments of the police to the defendant might have been deceptive,
154. 25 N.Y.2d 511, 517, 255 N.E.2d 696, 700, 307 N.Y.S.2d 430, 434-35 (1969).
155. Id. at 517, 255 N.E.2d at 700, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 434.
156. Matter of Stenzel v. B., 71 Misc. 2d 719, 336 N.Y.S.2d 836 (Sup. Ct. Niagara
County 1972).
157. Walther v. O'Connell, 72 Misc. 2d 316, 339 N.Y.S.2d 386 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y.
County 1972).
158. People v. Daniels, 102 Misc. 2d 540, 422 N.Y.S.2d 832 (Sup. Ct. Westchester
County 1979).
159. People v. Vernon, 89 Misc. 2d 472, 391 N.Y.S.2d 959 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1977).
160. United States v. Zeiger, 350 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1972), rev'd without opinion,
475 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Mich.
1972); United States v. Hart, 344 F. Supp. 522 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); United States v.
Dioguardi, 350 F. Supp. 1177 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
161. People v. Cutter, 12 Crim. L. Rep. 2133 (Super. Ct. Cal. 1972).
162. People v. Tarsia, 50 N.Y.2d 1, 8, 405 N.E.2d 188, 191, 427 N.Y.S.2d 944, 947
(1980).
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but unless the deception was so fundamentally unfair as to deny
due process or the deceptive statements involved threats or
promises, they did not render the confession involuntary.' 3
The court apparently was not aware, however, of the case of
People v. Dowling, 64 where a confession obtained under exami-
nation with voice analysis equipment was contradicted by a pol-
ygraph examination and apparently disproved by other physical
evidence. The case involved a fire in a store in Queens, New
York, which caused the death of a captain in the fire department
and injuries to other firemen. The fire marshals questioned Dow-
ling, who worked for a private fire alarm company, and who had
been in the store answering a false alarm. He agreed to submit
to examination on the voice stress equipment and, after some
time, the fire marshals recorded answers on tape that allegedly
amounted to a confession. He was arrested by the fire marshals
and charged with homicide and arson. Later, Dowling submitted
to polygraph examinations by a police department polygraph ex-
aminer who found no indication of falsehood when Dowling de-
nied setting the fire. Subsequent laboratory examinations of
physical evidence from the fire scene showed no evidence of the
use of kerosene or other accelerant material that Dowling had
allegedly confessed to using. The grand jury refused to indict,
and the charges were dismissed in spite of the alleged
confession.
IV. The PSE and the Standard of "General Acceptance"
Most of the courts which have considered the admissibility
of voice analysis have rejected it, comparing it to the results of
polygraph tests and then stating that the results of a polygraph
test are not admissible. The Frye case,'6 5 however, which is uni-
versally cited by appellate courts as the precedent for barring lie
detector evidence, did not impose a perpetual ban upon this
type of evidence. In fact, in its opinion, the court clearly stated
that "somewhere in this twilight zone, the evidential force of the
principle must be recognized."' 6
163. Id.
164. No. 531659 Crim. (Queens County 1975).
165. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
166. Id. at 1014.
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The appellate courts, however, which for over sixty years
have parroted the language of Frye by stating that the principle
has not "gained general acceptance in the particular field in
which it belongs, ' 167 have gone far beyond the precedent of the
Frye case to bar admission of such evidence. The standard of
"general acceptance," according to McCormick on Evidence,"8
is the standard for taking judicial notice, not for the admissibil-
ity of expert testimony. McCormick states that any relevant
conclusions which are supported by a qualified expert should be
received unless there are other reasons for exclusion, such as
prejudicing or misleading the jury, and that the general rule for
admissibility in most jurisdictions is that the expert be qualified
and that the testimony be helpful to the trier of fact.'6 9
McCormick also wrote: "If the courts used this approach, in-
stead of repeating a supposed requirement of 'general accept-
ance' not elsewhere imposed, they would arrive at a practical
way of utilizing the results of scientific advances. "170
Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence regarding "Testi-
mony by Experts" states: "If scientific, technical, or other spe-
cialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. '
On the question raised by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, "whether the Federal Rules of Evidence silently abol-
ished or adopted the Frye test,"'' 2 Weinstein and Berger state:
"Rule 702's failure to incorporate a general scientific acceptance
standard, and the Advisory Committee Note's failure to even
mention the Frye case must be considered significant. The si-
lence of its rule and its drafters should be regarded as tanta-
mount to an abandonment of the general acceptance
standard." 73
167. Id.
168. C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 203 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972); 9 J.
WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2567 (3d ed. 1940).
169. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 168, § 203.
170. Id.
171. FED. R. EVID. 702.
172. United States v. Valdez, 722 F.2d 1196, 1201 (5th Cir. 1984).
173. 3 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE § 702(03) (1988).
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The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine in applying the state
rule of evidence174 identical to Federal Rule 702175 held that the
requirement of general scientific acceptance was not adopted in
the new Maine Rules of Evidence.176 The Supreme Court of
Iowa, in State v. Hall,177 rejected the standard of general scien-
tific acceptance as a separate prerequisite for the admission of
scientific evidence as inconsistent with the modern concepts of
evidence embodied in the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Some of the United States circuit courts of appeals have in-
terpreted the enactment of Rule 702 as the rejection of the Frye
standard of general acceptance. The Second Circuit in United
States v. Williams 78 found that the general acceptance test of
Frye did not survive enactment of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence. The Fourth Circuit in United States v. Baller, 79 on the
admission of novel scientific evidence stated:
Unless an exaggerated popular opinion of the accuracy of a par-
ticular technique makes its use prejudicial or likely to mislead the
jury, it is better to admit relevant scientific evidence in the same
manner as other expert testimony and allow its weight to be at-
tacked by cross-examination and refutation.'
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v.
Oliver,'8' upheld the conviction of a defendant, based in part
upon the evidence given by a polygraph examiner, where the de-
fendant had agreed in advance that the results of the test could
be offered by the government if they were adverse to the defend-
ant. The trial judge in that case admitted the evidence, decided
that the polygraph examiner was qualified as an expert, and al-
lowed him to testify to indications of deception in the defend-
ant's answers to critical questions." 2 The appellate court cited
Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence defining "Relevant
Evidence" as the grounds for the admission of the polygraph ex-
174. ME. R. Evm. 702.
175. FED. R. EVID. 702.
176. State v. Williams, 388 A.2d 500 (Me. 1978).
177. State v. Hall, 297 N.W.2d 80 (Iowa 1980).
178. 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 117 (1979).
179. 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975).
180. Id. at 466.
181. 525 F.2d 731 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 973 (1976).
182. Id. at 734.
[Vol. 9:243
28http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol9/iss2/2
STRESS EVALUATOR
pert's testimony. 8 '
The Sixth Circuit, in Poole v. Perini,'84 cited the Oliver case
with approval'85 and, on a similar issue of admissibility of poly-
graph evidence upon stipulation, held that such evidence was
admissible in the Ohio state court and was not violative of the
defendant's rights.'8
In McMorris v. Israel,187 a state prisoner in Wisconsin filed
a petition for federal habeas corpus. The district court judge de-
nied the petition and the prisoner appealed. The Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit held that the refusal of the state
prosecutor to enter into a stipulation with the defendant with
respect to the admission of exculpatory polygraph evidence may
have violated the defendant's due process rights.' 88 Therefore,
the court of appeals reversed and remanded to the district court
with instructions that the writ should be granted if the refusal to
enter into the stipulation offered by the defendant was unjusti-
fied.' 89 In essence, the court found the prosecutor's veto of the
test to be constitutionally impermissible because he stated no
reasons for refusing to stipulate.'90 This seems to be an extreme
extension of federal power over the state court, particularly as it
relates to the admission of polygraphic evidence, coming from a
federal court of appeals, which has routinely denied admission of
expert testimony on polygraph evidence with no more reasoning
than that it had not been generally accepted.
Federal courts have recognized that "the trial judge has
broad discretion in the matter of the admission or exclusion of
expert evidence, and his action is to be sustained unless mani-
festly erroneous."' 9 ' The New York Court of Appeals' interpre-
tation is substantially the same:
The prevailing rule is that the question of the qualification of a
witness to testify as an expert is for determination, in his reason-
183. Id. at 739.
184. 659 F.2d 730 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 910 (1982).
185. Id. at 735.
186. Id.
187. 643 F.2d 458 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 967 (1982).
188. Id. at 466.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Salem v. United States Lines Co., 370 U.S. 31, 35 (1962).
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able discretion, by the trial court, which discretion, when exer-
cised, is not open to review unless in deciding the question the
trial court has made a serious mistake or committed an error of
law or has abused his discretion.19
Section 702 of the Proposed Rules of Evidence of the State
of New York concerning expert witnesses is identical with Fed-
eral Rule 702.193 If New York follows the trend set in other
states which have adopted rules identical to the federal rules,
acceptance of novel scientific evidence will increase. The trend
apparently is to expand the admissiblity of evidence beyond the
limits of the common-law rules.
V. Conclusion
When an experienced trial judge states that a great majority
of trials turn on the question of credibility and that perjury is
prevalent,194 the appellate courts should no longer ignore the
problems facing the trial courts in their search for truth. Dean
Wicker said in 1953 that "[t]he legal profession can no longer
assume a complacent attitude concerning our present methods
of exposing mendacity.' 1 95 He also stated that lawyers and
judges "know that there is entirely too much intentional perjury
[in our courtrooms today] and that it is usually difficult, and
often impossible, for even an experienced trial lawyer to expose
a [lying witness] on cross-examination."'9 6
Research into the use of voice stress analysis as a lie detec-
tor has so far failed to establish the validity of this technique.
This failure, however, should not discourage further research or
the production of better equipment to use in voice analysis as a
means of detecting deception. Hearings held by the New York
Legislature in 1978, prior to the passage of Article 20-B of the
Labor Law banning the use of the PSE for employment tests,
produced voluminous material from users of the PSE stating
192. Meiselman v. Crown Heights Hosp., 285 N.Y. 389, 398-99, 34 N.E.2d 367, 372
(1941).
193. A CODE OF EVIDENCE FOR THE STATE OF NEW YORK § 702 (1982); 1983 N.Y. LAWS
2188-89.
194. People v. Cutter, 12 Crim. L. Rep. 2133 (Super. Ct. Cal. 1972).
195. Wicker, The Polygraph Truth Test, 22 TENN. L. REV. 711, 712 (1953).
196. Id.
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that they found it to correlate with the results of polygraph
tests. A report of a Special Hearing Officer of the Secretary of
State of the State of Florida on the Psychological Stress Evalu-
ator was submitted at the hearings. 197 The hearing officer re-
ported a demonstration of the PSE equipment and a polygraph
on a subject in which the two methods produced substantial
similarities in the indications of stress.19
Despite over sixty-five years of experience with the poly-
graph, millions of tests and numerous scientific studies, and de-
spite the clearly expressed wishes of trial courts, appellate courts
have denied the admissibility of the results of a polygraph test
except in rare circumstances. For more than sixty years appel-
late courts have relied upon, as an immutable rule of law, the
simple statement of fact in the Frye case that the test has not
yet been generally accepted as reliable.
In view of the attitude of the appellate courts toward the
admissibility of the results of a polygraph test as a means of de-
tecting falsehood, it is obvious that the Psychological Stress
Evaluator and the Voice Stress Analyzer will have the same dif-
ficulty in obtaining admissibility into evidence.
197. WILLIAM G. O'NEILL, PSYCHOLOGICAL STRESS EVALUATOR, HEARING OFFICER,
FLORIDA DEP'T OF STATE, REPORT OF SPECIAL HEARING OFFICER (1974).
198. Id.
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